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Living La Vida Lex Mercatoria
Helen E. Hartnell *

I. -

INTRODUCTION

My two-year sojourn at the University of Cologne (2004-2006) provided an
intense occasion for living la vida lex mercatoria. This essay explores key
facets of that experience. At the outset, I approach the topic from a traditional
scholarly perspective, first by offering a brief overview of theoretical debates
about the lex mercatoria, then by arguing the need for more social scientific
(and particularly empirical) research in this field. Next my focus shifts to the
Willertl C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot (Vis Moot), and
considers the role of legal education in reproducing the lex mercatoria as a
living phenomenon. In each of these contexts, I garner and examine available
empirical evidence, and suggest ways in which interdisciplinary research
might enrich our knowledge of the transnational legal field. Finally, the essay
takes up some broader questions that arose during my two years in Cologne,
particularly relating to the extreme skepticism with which German colleagues
greeted my socio-legal 1 turn. In the spirit of carrying on the discussions that
began during those years, I conclude with some comparative reflections on
multi-/interdisciplinarity in the legal academy. Thus, as a whole, this essay

* Professor of law, Golden Gate University School of law, San Francisco (United States
of America) and DMD GastlehrstuhlfUr anglo-amerikanisches Recht, Freie UniversitatBerlin
(Germany) (WS 2006-07). This is an updated and expanded version of a contribution made under
the same title to Klaus Peter Berger I Georg Borges I Harald Herrmann I Andreas SchlUter I Ulrich
Wackerbarth (Eds.), Zivil- und Wirtschaftsrecht im Europaischen und G/obalen Kontext: Festschrift
fUr Norbert Horn zum 70. Geburtstag - Private and Commercial Law in a European and Global
Context (Berlin: De Gruyter Recht 2006), 355-376, and is republished with the kind permission of
De Gruyter Recht.
1 'I use the term "socio-Iegal" to include the full panoply of multi- and interdisciplinary
approaches to the study of law, despite the term's semantic limitations. The "law and society"
tradition in the United States includes the widest imaginable range of approaches to the study of
law, including but not limited to those informed by the disciplines of anthropology, economics,
gender studies, history, linguistics, literature, philosophy, political science, psychology, rhetoric,
and sociology., In one British scholar's view, "[s]ociological analysis of law has as its sole unifying
objective the attempt to remedy the assumed inadequacy of lawyers' doctrinal analyses of law."
Roger COTIERREll, Law's Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (1995), 25.
Rev. dr. unif. 2007
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combines analysis of scholarly debates, investigation of empirical data, and
reflection on legal academic culture from an American perspective. To this
extent, it exemplifies the best (or worst, depending on one's predilections)
eclectic tendencies of some socio-Iegal scholarship.
II. - LEX MERCATORIA AND THE NEED FOR AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH

Any argument about the "need" for an empirical approach to the lex
mercatoria - which term I use as a synonym for "new law merchant" as
developed in the post-World War" era - presupposes an initial assessment of
the phenomenon. I do not begin with a legalistic definition of the term, since
that approach would beg the underlying questions. Rather, I begin by briefly
surveying the academic debates over lex mercatoria, in order to illuminate the
contours of this transnational field and to identify the stakes in the often
heated debates. Insofar as possible, the discussion of substance is integrated
with that of the contractual, arbitral, and other contexts in which lex
mercatoria emerges and plays its role. This tack reflects my views on the
interdependent relationship between these different aspects of the
phenomenon, as well as the inductive approach endemic to Common Law
thinking on any legal topic.
One of the dominant debates about lex mercatoria concerns its nature, in
particular whether it is an autonomous legal order or not. 2 The heated
academic controversies over this question express fundamental disagreements
about the characteristics of the legal framework that is - or should be available to govern international economic relations, but also refract broader
jurisprudential and other theoretical concerns. My bird's-eye view of the
"autonomy" discourse yields two conclusions: first, that different authors use
the terms "autonomy" (or "autonomous") in significantly different ways; and
second, that they use the' same concept to address a variety of distinct (albeit
inextricably related) aspects of the lex mercatoria phenomenon, namely its
normativity (i.e., origins or sources and contents), on the one hand, and its
2
My analysis focuses on the broader multidisciplinary debate over autonomy, rather
than the narrower (but no less important) legal debate. over whether lex mercatoria rises to the
level of a legal order or system. While I recognize that these issues are linked in the minds of legal
scholars, insofar as completeness and systematicity are considered prerequisites to autonomous
status as a legal order, my goal here is not to rehash the legal debates, but rather to examine them
from a different perspective. My approach only roughly approximates the socio-epistemological
approach of Nikitas HAlZIMIHAll, The Many Lives - and Faces - of Lex Mercatoria: An Essay on
the Genealogy of International Business Law (2006 manuscript) (providing a detailed
historiography of the lex mercatoria literature).

Llvmg La Vidactex-MerGato(ia.._~ ______n.

effectivity (i.e., how and whether it "works" in practice, particularly in
connection with international commercial arbitration), on the other. The
essential point to grasp here is that these two aspects of lex mercatoria are
interdependent .and mutually constitutive. 3 Explicit engagement with these
dimensions of the debate over the autonomy of lex mercatoria might help to
break the intellectual gridlock in this field.

With regard to my first conclusion, virtually all authors agree that
/lautonomy" implies something that is outside the realm of the State, notwithstanding their often vastly different frames of reference. In particular, some
authors use the term to mean /lsocietal" (in the sense of referring to extra-legal
norms), while others use it to mean "transnational" (in the sense of pointing
beyond the nation-State). Moreover, while all authors depart from the positivist
notion of the (nation-)State as the only source of law, they differ in regard to
which societal actors they look to - viz., merchants or the legal profession - as
sources. Finally, the term "autonomy" is sometimes used to refer narrowly to the
parties' freedom of contract, while at other times it is deployed more broadly to
mean the systemic autonomy of lex mercatoria itself. This latter discrepancy
ranges, in other words, from narrow concern with the liberty of economic actors
themselves, to a broader concern with the power of the legal profession to
disencumber economic activity (and hence also legal practice) from substantive
or procedural interference by the State.

..

.

I turn now to consider the more concrete debates over the two aspects of
lex mercatoria identified above ~ i.e., its normativity and its effectivity - which
are both implicated in the autonomy discourse. The following discussion of
normativity is subdivided into two parts, corresponding to what are labelled
here as first- and second-order debates.
In terms of the normativity (i.e., the origins or sources) of lex mercatoria,
the first-order debate concerns whether the norms arise spontaneously from and are thus driven by the functional needs of - the business community ("self-

I

~

3
I read De ly's characterization of the lex mercatoria as "a method of judicial and
arbitral adjudication" as compatible with the perspective that the norms must be seen, indeed can
only be fully comprehended, in the context of commercial dispute resolution. See Filip DE LY,
"Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation and International Self-regulation", in R.P.
Appelbaum I Wm. L.F. Felstiner I V. Gessner (Eds.), Rules and Networks: The Legal Culture of
Global Business Transactions (2001), 159-188 {180} [hereinafter: Felstiner I Gessner, Rules and
Networks}. Accord, Emmanuel GAILLARD, NTransnational law: A Legal System or a Method of
Comparative Decision-Making?", in Klaus Peter Berger (Ed.), The Practice of Transnational Law
(2001), 53-65 (hereinafter: Berger, The Practice of Transnational Law) (lex mercatoria is a method
of comparative law reasoning). The view I put forward here is slightly broader than De Ly's
conception, insofar as it embraces extra-legal as well as legal forms of dispute resolution.
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regulation"), or whether they arise through the intervention of the State. The first
position tends to find support among a strange group of bedfellows that can be
variously characterized as legal pluralists,4 economists,S constructivists,6
systems theorists,7 and other socia-legal scholars,8 whereas the second position
is largely the province of legal positivists and traditional private international law
scholars. It is virtually impossible to disentangle objective from value-based
perspectives in the context of this debate, since normative considerations are
thoroughly imbricated in the theoretical presuppositions that animate the
observers. That ultimate stakes are in play is reflected by the labels "religiOUS
war" 9 and "trench warfare" 10 that have been used in this context.

4
See, e.g., Gunther TEUBNER, 'Global Bukowina': legal Pluralism in a World Society",
in Gunther Teubner (Ed.), Global Law without a State (1997),3-28.
5
See, e.g., Robert COOTER, HStructural Adjudication and the New law Merchant: A
Model of Decentralized law", 14 International Review of Law & Economics (1994), 215-231 (215)
(a A community of people forms a special network whose members develop relationships with
each other through repeated interactions. The modern economy creates many specialized
business communities. ... Wherever there are communities, norms arise to coordinate the
interaction of people.... I refer to all such norms of business communities as the new law
merchant. ").
6
See, e.g., A. Claire CUTLER, Hpublic Meets Private: The International Unification and
Harmonization of Private International Trade law", 13(1) Global Society (1999), 25-48 (discussing
the unifying influence exerted by a global"mercatocracy" or merchant class and a global business
culture); id., aprivate international regimes and interfirm cooperation", in Rodney Bruce Hall I
Thomas J. Biersteker (Eds.), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (2002), 2340 (35) [hereinafter: Hall I Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority] (asserting that athe
corporate world wants and is generating private, ad hoc, and discretionary standards''); William
SCHEUERMAN, "Economic Globalization and the Rule of law", 6(1) Constellations: An International
Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory (May 1999), 3-25 (arguing that Hboth a unifying
corporate elite and the compression of time and space are obviating the need for explicit,
predictable, and fixed rules").
7
See, e.g., Mathias ALBERT, Zur Politik der Weltwinschaft (2002). See also Gralf-Peter
CALLIESS, "Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of
Private law", 23 Zeitschrift fiir Rechtssoziologie (2002), 185-216 (endorsing Teubner's "reflexive
law" approach to transnational law, which marks a " 'third way' between market and State: a civil
society basically regulating itself, supported, if necessary activated, but essentially merely framed
and supervised by the State," and which constitutes a synthesis of the "descriptive Systems Theory
of Niklas Luhmann and the normativist Discourse Theory of JOrgen Habermas").
8
See, general/y, the contributions in the following edited volumes: Volkmar Gessner /
Ali Cem Budak (Eds.), Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law
(1998) [hereinafter: Gessner / Budak, Emerging Legal Certainty]; Felstiner I Gessner, Rules and
Networks, supra note 3.
9
Michael Joachim BONELL; "Die UNIDROIT Prinzipien der internationalen Handelsvertrage: Eine neue lex Mercatoria?", 37 Zeitschrift {iir Rechtsverg/eichung (1996), 152-157. (152).
H

Unir. L. Rev. 2007

-~~-------~----.-.--

-

--~

Livmg La vloa Lex IVIt:'\"(lLV •• u

------.--------- - - -

_._--------

What often gets lost in the all-or-nothing battle between these opposing
camps is the possibility that norms might arise through the intervention of
other civil society groups, such as legal actors.ll Strict adherents to either
polar position on the autonomy question would assume this problem away,
by assimilating legal actors either to the business community (sometimes
referred to as the "community of merchants" or societas mercatorum) or to the
State, and thus deny them any agency of their own. Yet history, as noted
below, shows that legal actors have on occasion supported (or opposed) the
lex mercatoria in the service of their own professional interests. If this third
alternative is taken into account, then the all-or-nothin"g battle over the
autonomy of the origin or sources of the lex mercatoria simply cannot be won
in a fair fight. 12 Indeed, the only way for one argument to prevail over the
other would be on definitional grounds. Thus, if the narrow definition is
adopted, according to which lex mercatoria consists only of those norms
spontaneously generated within the (extra-legal) economic realm to govern its
own affairs, then lex mercatoria is by definition autonomous or unconstrained
by the State along this dimension. Conversely, if a broader definition is
adopted,13 then the lex mercatoria may include positive law (e.g., domestic
10 Klaus Peter BERGER, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (1999), 32
[hereinafter: BERGER, Creeping Codificatiori1. According to Berger, ibid., at 33, the "intrinsic evil"
of the lex mercatoria doctrine is that discussions about it are Hfrequently too emotional and too
passionate. "
11
As Dasser has aptly put it, II Are we talking about legal rules created by merchants, or
legal rules created for merchants by academics, legislators and others?": Felix DASSER, "Lex
Mercatoria - Critical Comments on a Tricky Topic", in Felstiner / Gessner, Rules and Networks,
supra note 3, at 189-200 (189).
12 As for the effect of these debates within the business community itself, see DASSER,
supra note 11, at 191 ("[A]sk almost any businessperson what he or she thinks of the lex
mercatoria or the autonomous legal order of intemational commerce, and you will earn a blank
stare.").
13 Horn, who prefers the broader definition of lex mercatoria, has steered a pragmatic
course around the quicksand of debates over autonomy. See, e.g., Norbert HORN, HThe Use of
Transnational Law in the CO[ltract Law of Intemational Trade and Finance", in Berger, The
Practice of Transnational Law, supra note 3, at 67-80(73-74) [hereinafter: HORN, Transnational
Law] ("We need not discuss here the controversial question of whether private parties are
empowered to detach their contract entirely from the application of domestic law. Let us assume,
instead, that most national laws allow at lea~t a partial reference tointemationally recognized
rules or to any other set of rules as part of party autonomy."). He knows this to be true, based on
personal experience, and indeed empirical studies confirm this as fact. See also Norbert HORN,
IIUniformity and Diversity in the Law of Intemational Commercial Contracts", in Norbert Hom /
Clive M. Schmitthoff (Eds.), The Transnational Law of International Commercial Transactions
(1982), 3 (16) (noting that the existence of de facto similarities of rules found in various legal
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rules enabling private autonomy; the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)), as well as other norms
generated or "restated" by legal actors (e.g., the UN/DROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts; the "Lando" Principles of European
Contract Law; the lists drawn up by various scholars), and is thus not strictly
autonomous. 14 In the end, resolving this dispute at the definitional level is
impractical, since neither camp would concede the other's definition, and
would achieve a hollow victory at best.
The second-order debate about the normativity of lex mercatoria is the
more practical one concerning its actual content. Obviously the content
depends on whether one adopts the first (narrow definition) or second (broad
definition) position identified above, and thus on one's views about the
recognized sources of lex mercatoria norms. Those who subscribe to the
narrow view (i.e., that only norms generated by business itself count) face a
challenge that is theoretically straightforward, but difficult in practice, namely
to identify such norms as may exist in different commercial branches or
locales. 15 The need for empirical studies in this context is insurmountable, if
the claim that such norms exist is to be proven. 16 A few studies of the
practices of particular industries have been undertaken to date,17 and others
systems constitute "a first step towards uniformity; but by no means can we speak here of
elements of an 'autonomous' law of intemational commerce").
14 Berger argues for an intermediate or hybrid position: lex mercatoria is an
"independent, 'third' supranational legal system between domestic law and public international
law, a legal system that is created and developed by the law-making forces of the intemational
business community." BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 43.
15 The legal perspective sharply distinguishes custom and trade usages from law: "Trade
usages do not have the quality of law. Together with other 'factual legal sources', such as general
conditions of trade or customs, they constitute the first step towards the development of customary
law and towards the creation of a lex mercatoria. 'All customary law of international trade has the
quality of trade usages but not all trade usages are customary law.'" BERGER, Creeping
Codification, supra note 10, at 41 (quoting Felix DASSER, Internationa/e Schiedsgerichte und Lex
Mercatoria (1989), 91).
16 For a general argument supported by empirical evidence about extra-legal ordering
outside the commercial context, see Robert C. EllICKSON, Order Without Law: How Neighbors
Settle Disputes (1991) .

.17 lisa BERNSTEIN, "Opting Out of the legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Trade", 21 Journal of Legal Studies (1992), 115-157; Klaus FRICK, "Third Cultures
versus Regulators: Cross-border legal Relations of Banks", in Gessner / Budak, Emerging Legal
Certainty, supra note 8, at 93-137; Barak D. RICHMAN, "Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and
Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry", Duke Law School Legal Studies Research
Paper, No. 134 (2006); Christine STAMMEl, "Back to the Courtroom? Developments in the london
Reinsurance Market", in Gessner / Budalv Emerging Legal Certainty, supra note 8, at 61-91. See,
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are underway.18 However, the prospect of distilling such universal (legal)
principles as might exist from the multitude of particular customs, trade usages
or other practices would be daunting, in the unlikely event that proponents of
the ·narrow view were to undertake such a task.
In terms of content, the (primarily legal) scholars who adopt the broader
definition have an easier job of it, at least insofar as there is widespread
(though not complete) agreement on the major sources of hard and 50ft lex
mercatoria norms. Horn identifies three transnational sources of such
norms: 19 international conventions and treaties; semi-official texts that remain
outside any legislative procedure (e.g., the 1994 UN/DROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, which he identifies as the IImost influential unofficial source" of lex mercatoria 20); and non-codified principles that
may be used by lawyers when drafting international commercial and financial
contracts and are recognized by courts and arbitral tribunals. Horn's list of
sources raises crucial methodological questions, which can only be touched
upon here.
Berger takes up the methodological challenge in his book on the
"creeping codification" of lex mercatoria, which self-consciously (but
nonetheless paradoxically) opens with Oliver Wendell Holmes' classic quote
about the Common law: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience." 21 Accordingly, Berger builds his "open-ended and flexible"
generally, Volkmar GESSNER! Richard P. ApPELBAUM! William LF. FELSTINER, "Introduction: The
Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions", in Felstiner I Gessner, Rules and Networks, supra
note 3, at 1-36 [hereinafter: GESSNER! ApPElBAUM/FELSTINER] .
. 18 One young scholar at the University of Bremen has studied the timber industry in
search of extra-legal trade norms. See Wioletta KONRADI, "lex Mercatoria Approach to
Globalization" Oanuary 2006 manuscript}; Idem, "Lex mercatoria als globales Recht der
Wirtschaft? Die Koordination der Intemationalen Transaktionen am Beispiel der Holzindustrie",
University of Bremen
TranState
Working Paper,
No. 056/2007, available at
< httpjlwww.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de>.
. 19 HORN, Transnational Law, supra note 13, at .67. Horn defines transnational law as "all
law stemming from or under the influence of transnational sources of law and regulating acts or
events that transcend national frontiers." Ibid. He acknowledges that narrower definitions of the
lex mercatoria only include the latter two sources, but argues that it is "advisable ... to follow the
... broader use of the term, and to also include conventions, because codified and uncodified law
are closely interrelated .... " Ibid., at 68. See also Clive SCHMITIHOFF, Commercial Law in a
Changing Economic Climate (1981), 47 et seq.
20 HORN, Transnational Law, supra note 13, at 74.
21 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at xiii. Berger is doubly paradoxical, in
that he combines the pragmatic and realist orientations of a lawyer and experienced arbitrator
with a strong commitment to lex mercatoria as an autonomous legal order. See, generally, ibid., at
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compilation or "restatement" of the "Principles, Rules and Standards of the
Lex Mercatoria" 22 on the foundational assumption that lex mercatoria is an
"autonomous legal system" that is "coming into being by way of
decentralized, 'spontaneous' law-making" in a dialectical way through the
"interaction between commercial practice and the law." 23 Moreover, inspired
by Eugen Ehrlich's notion of the "living law", Berger argues further that the
search for legal rules and principles within this legal system 24 "may not be
reduced to a mere logical deduction from a predetermined normative
system," 25 but must occur within an "unwritten framework of values and
convictions providing and enriching it with the necessary logical consistency
and internal unity." 26 In the end, Berger's inductive and comparative legal
32-113. A reviewer has described one of Berger's books as "part introduction, part manifesto."
Nikitas HATZIMIHAIL, /lBook Review of Berger, The Practice of Transnational Law", 70(4) Rabels
Zeitschrift fur auslandisches und internationa/es Privatrecht (2006), 823-826. It bears mention,
however, that Berger's commitment to the autonomy of the lex mercatoria must be distinguished
from that of the purists who would only look to extra-legal business norms, and not to norms
ascertained through the interventions of legal actors.
22 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, Annex I, at 278-311. Although Berger's
"List of Principles, Rules and Standards of the Lex Mercatoria" frequently cites international and
domestic hard laws, he stresses that such rules merely "serve as an indication that a common
understanding of the subject matters of these rules and principles exists in all major legal systems",
which, in tum, may /lultimately lead to the development of general principles which become part
of the autonomous world trade law." Ibid., at 39.
23 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 112-113. In Berger's view, "economy
and law ... are not regarded as antipodes but as complementary elements which in their combined
effect and through the law-making force of the parties' contractual consensus create commercial
law." Ibid., at 113. In this regard, Berger's argument bears some resemblance to Teubner's
discussion of Luhmann's notion of "structural coupling". See Gunther TEUBNER,"Breaking Frames:
Economic Globalization and the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria", 5(2) European Journal of Social
Theory (2002), 199-217 (207) (recognizing /lother types of social rule production as law
production, but only under the condition that they are produced in the periphery of the legal
system in structural coupling with external social processes of rule-formation. ").

24 The lex mercatoria is systematic insofar as the individual rules or principles exist
"within a teleological framework that is formed by logical and grammatical rules leading to the
grouping and coordination of legal institutions," and that provides "the necessary framework not
only for the application of the law to individual cases but also for the evolution and refinement of
this legal system as a 'law in action'." BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 91.
25 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 91 (citing Norbert HORN, ·Zur
Bedeutung der Topiklehre Theodor Viehwegs fur eine einheitliche Theorie des juristischen
Denkens", 21 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1967), 601 (602». Moreover, Berger (ibid., at 93)
rejects the insistence that a legal system must have an "axiomatic self-contained character" as "a
positivist myth" (citing Eugen EHRLICH, Grundlegungder Soziologie des Rechts (1913, 1929), 345,
and Karsten SCHMIDT, Die Zukunft der Kodifikationsidee (1985),19).
26

BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 91-92. In this respec~ Berger argues
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--------------------------------------------------------method for ascertaining the content of the lex mercatoria is one that warms
the Common Law heart, while his invocation of Ehrlich's "living law" tradition
bolsters my claim that empirical studies have an important role to play in this
transnational legal field. However, I caution against conflating the inductive
Common Law methodology, as a technique for distilling doctrines (i.e., principles and rules) from what courts and arbitral tribunals have done, with the
broader socio-Iegal preoccupation about "law in action", which is only
incidentally concerned with such doctrinal matters.27 Ehrlich's "living law"
and the Common Law have strong affinities for one another, and can be
productively combined, as Berger's approach suggests, but they are far from
identical.
In terms of the effectivity of the lex mercatoria (i.e., how and whether it
"works" in the context of dispute resolution), the debates over autonomy take
on a less heated, albeit no less significant character. Indeed, from a practical
perspective, the ultimate answer to the question of autonomy depends on
whether the State yields to privatized forms of dispute resolution - whether
legal or extra-legal - or insists on imposing itself upon the parties to a
commercial transaction.28 This is the quintessential lawyers' realm, in which
debates over party autonomy are a proxy war for the struggle between
national jurisdiction and a-national (or denationalized 29) dispute resolution.
The crucial questions here are two-fold and pertain to applicable law: first,
whether parties are free to choose something other than positive (i.e., national
or international) law, such as lex mercatoria norms or ex aqueo et bono

that lithe reference to unwritten general principles of law has today to a large extent replaced
positivistic approaches to decision-making, thereby introducing a new pluralism into the classical
and largely positivistic theory of legal sources." Ibid., at 92.

27 As a consequence of this difference, Berger's use of the term "law in action" is quite
different from my own understanding and usage of that term, as elaborated in note 40 infra.

28 "[MJarket authority does not simply supplant sovereign (public) authority"; rather,
I/sovereign authority accommodates the burgeoning demands for market authority by participating
in its own transformation." Thomas J. BIERSTEKER / Rodney Bruce HAll, "Private authority as global
governance", in Hall! Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority, supra note 6, at 203-222
(209). See, generally, Dieter MA~TINY, "Traditional Private and Commercial Law Rules under the
Pressure of Global Transactions: The Role for an International Order", in Felstiner I Gessner, Rules
and Networks, supra note 3, at 123-155.
29 See Michael ZORN, "Sovereignty and Law in a Denationalised World", in Felstiner!
Gessner, Rules and Networks, supra note 3, at 39"71 (40) (preferring the term "societal
denationalisation" to I/globalisation"). See also DE LY, supra note 3, at 167 (asking "whether
globalisation actually is occurring or whether we see much more denationalisation and regional
forms of internationalisation.").

-'- -.-:, ?nn7
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resolution of their dispute, to govern their relationship;30 and second, whether
they may opt out (and thus evade the application) of distasteful provisions of the
otherwise applicable positive law(s). Most legal scholars accept that the lex
mercatoria must either yield to 31 or otherwise accommodate "the socioeconomic values and policy decisions which stand behind mandatory provisions of domestic law [having1 an ordre public-quality," 32 but not all do so,33
Some empirical studies have looked at what parties (and their lawyers) actually
do in their transnational contracts,34 but more work along these lines is needed.
30 "Schmitthoff said in 1964 that lex mercatoria applies if and so far as allowed by the
national laws." HORN, Transnational Law, supra note 13, at 80.
31 For arguments that internationally mandatory provisions of law retain their character as
legal. "trumps" and should be applied even in the arbitral context, see Ulrich DROBNIG,
"Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und wirtschaftliche Eingriffsnormen", in Festschrift· Kegel
(1987), 95; Jan SCHIFFER, Normen aus/andischen Hoffent/ichen" Rechts in internationalen
Handelsschiedsverfahren (1990), 44ff. See also, A. BARRACLOUGH / J. WAINCYMER, "Mandatory
Rules of law in International Commercial Arbitration", 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law
(2005), 205; D. HOCHSTRASSER, "Choice of law and 'Foreign' Mandatory Rules in International
Arbitration", 11 Journal of International Arbitration (1994), 57; A.S. RAu, "The Arbitrator and
Mandatory Rules of law," American Review of International Arbitration (Spring 2008); N. VOSER,
"Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial
Arbitration", 7 American Review of International Arbitration (1996), 319.
32 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 75. Berger himself does not subscribe
to this widely-accepted view, however.
33 Consistent with his role as one of the leading legal proponents of the idealistic view
that lex mercatoria is an autonomous legal order, Berger argues that scholars who insist on
preserving "the general notion of ordre public inherent in any domestic legal system '"
misunderstand the true quality of the lex mercatoria." BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note
10, at 76. In lieu of the traditional (nation}-State-based notion of ordre public, he argues instead
that lex mercatoria should be "supplemented by the creation of an a-national, i.e. transnational
ordre public" based on the existing "uniform ethical understanding in international commercial
affairs," which in his view is evidenced by the IImass of ethical and moral rules and principles"
found in lithe various Codes of Conduct drafted by international organizations." Ibid., at 77.
34 See, e.g., Klaus Peter BERGER / Holger DUBBE~STEIN / Sascha LEHMANN / Victoria
PETZOLD, "The CENTRAL Enquiry on the Use of Transnational Law in International Contract Law
and Arbitration: Background, Procedure and Selection", 9 Mealey's International Arbitration
Report (2000), 15, available at <http://www.tldb.de> (Transnational law Database), also
available in German, at 101 Zeitschrift fUr vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft(2002), 12-37;
Stephen R. BOND, "How to Draft an Arbitration Clause (Revisited), 1(2) ICC Bulletin (1990),14; DE
lv, supra note 3, at 172-173 (surnmarizing empirical evidence regarding the frequency and means
of application of contract clauses, general conditions, standard terms, self-regulatory rules,usages
and custom in international trade); Christopher R. DRAHOZAL, IICommercial Norms, Commercial
Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration", 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
(2000),79-146; Barton S. SELDEN, "lex Mercatoria in European and U.S. Trade Practice: Time to
Take a Closer Look", 2 Golden Gate University Annual Survey of International & Comparative
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The ultimate test of autonomy, at least from a legalistic perspective, is
wRat arbitral tribunals and courts do in particular cases. No legal scholar
would argue that arbitration itself is fully autonomous, given the role of
national courts in enforcing arbitration agreements and awards (e.g., under the
1958 "NeW York" Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards), as well as their ancillary (but nonetheless important)
procedural roles in the context of international commercial arbitration. Here,
too, some empirical studies eXist,35 but further "law in action" studies would
be welcome, both to fill in the lacuna in our knowledge about how lex
mercatoria works on the ground, and to provide a basis for resolving the
perennial theoretical debates,36
Numerous scholars 37 have noted with regret that empirical studies are

Law (1995), 111 (114, 119) (reporting, on the basis of an informal survey, that most practicing
lawyers strongly preferred stipulating "definitive" and "provable" laws to an explicit choice of lex
mercatoria); UNIDROIT (Ed.), The Use of the UN/DRO/T Principles in Practice: Results of the First
Inquiry Undertaken by the Secretariat of UN/DRO/T (1997).
35 In addition to the works cited supra in note 34, some of which look at court or arbitral
practices in addition to contract practices, see also DASSER, supra note 11, at 188-200

(summarizing thqt author's prior empirical work); Christopher R. Drahozal / Richard W. Naimark
(Eds.), Towards a Science of International Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research (2005);
Stephanie E. KEER / Richard W. NAIMARK, "Arbitrators Do Not Split-the-Baby: Empirical Evidence
from International Business Arbitrations", 18(5) Kluwer Journal of International Arbitration (Aug.
2001); Richard W. NAIMARKI Stephanie E. KEER,"Analysis of UNCITRAL Questionnaires on Interim
ReHef", 3 Mealey's International Arbitration Report (2001); Richard W. NAIMARK I Stephanie E.
KEER, "Intemational Private Commercial Arbitration - Expectations and Perceptions of Attomeys
and Business People: A Forced-Rank Analysis", 30 International Business Lawyer (May 2002), 203209; Randall PEERENBOOM, "Seek Truth From Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards in the PRC", 49 American Journal of Comparative Law (2001),249-327.
36 To suggest just one example, it would be useful to know more about arbitral and court
practice in regard to intemationally mandatory norms; since this would provide a strong indicator
of the measure of arbitral autonomy, regardless of whether the award was rendered on the basis of
national or denationalized norms. This question has important policy implications, as suggested
by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473
U.S. 614 (1985), which allowed claims based on U.S. antitrust laws to be submitted to arbitration. I
have personal knowledge of one case in which claims based on an expressly (and internationally)
mandatory domestic u.s. law were ignored by an international arbitral tribunal sitting outside the
U.s., with the consequence that a distributor who should have been protected against
unscrupulous conduct by its supplier was denied an opportunity to assert such claims, and
ultimately went bankrupt.
37 See, e.g., DE Lv, supra note 3, at 173; GESSNER/ ApPELBAUM/ FELSTINER, supra note 17,at
28 (noting the "almost complete lack of communication" between legal and social-scientific
discourses on global transactions, and issuing an urgent plea for interdisciplinary research in this
field of study); MARTINY, supra note 28, at 124-125.
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few and far between in the transnational legal field.38 Yet the available
literature, while spotty, offers ample food for thought. Here I wish to identify
two types of studies, mention a few examples, and then consider the broader
implications of their findings.3 9 The first type of empirical approach identifies
a gap between "law in the books" (i.e., "black letter" or doctrinal law) and
"law in action" (i.e., examining whether, and if so how the existing rules are
deployed in practice).40 This approach is exemplified by two studies
conducted in the United States, both of which found that the CISG was
virtually unknown to courts and practitioners ten years after it had become the
law of the land.41
The second type of empirical study points to a different kind of gap one between "law in academic books" and "law in action". Three studies of
this sort point toward similar conclusions. The first study was conducted by
Dasser, who researched arbitral awards to find out whether lex mercatoria
was actually being used to resolve cases. Dasser's study revealed that "most of
the awards do not really apply international trade usage, that is, rules created

38 In addition to the studies cited supra in notes 34 and 35, see also Yves DEZALAY I
Bryant G. GARTH, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of
a Transnational Legal Order (1996); Christopher R. DRAHOZAL, "Of Rabbits and Rhinoceri: A
Survey of Empirical Research on International Commercial Arbitration", 20(1) Journal of
International Arbitration (Feb. 2003), 23-34.
39 Given space limits, I do not evaluate the sufficiency of the empirical evidence upon
which the cited conclusions rest. The authors of one of the cited studies admit that their conclusion is based on scant empirical evidence. GESSNER/ ApPELBAUM/ FELSTINER, supra note 17, at 28.

40 This definition points up the key difference between my socio-Iegal use of the term
"law in action" and Berger's useof the same term, as already noted supra in note 27. Ehrlich's
innovation was to reach outside the formal system of law, especially as found in the Continental
codes, in order to discover the operative rules of conduct prevailing in various sectors of society.
From my perspective, Berger's pluralist approach is an application of Common Law methods in a
transnational context to ascertain what the rules are, given the assumption that there are no (or at
least too few) "laws on the books". I do not equate the inductive work of examining judicial or
arbitral deciSions, in order to ascertain -the legal principles articulated there, with "empirical"
studies of law in the socio-Iegal sense. Rather, in the u.s. context, "law in action" or empirical
approaches to the study of law include virtually everything but doctrinal approaches. See,
generally, Volkmar GESSNER, "Globalization and Legal Certainty", in Gessner / Budak, Emerging
Legal Certainty, supra note 8, at 427-450; Stewart Macaulay / Lawrence M. Friedman I Elizabeth
Mertz (Eds.), Law in Action: A Socio-Legal Reader (2007).
41 James E. BAILEY, "Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Lawof International Sales", 32 Cornell
Journal of International Law (1999), 273. See also Michael GORDON, 46 American Journal of
Comparative Law (1998), 361-378 (observing the limited extent to which the Clse and UNIDROIT
Principles had penetrated the legal consciousness and culture of Florida).
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by merchants, but rather some general principle of law which is more an
amalgamation of national laws or a fancy word for the arbitrator's subjective
sense of justice. In other words, [he1 found very few traces of a lex mercatoria
in its original sense." 42 These findings led Dasser to the following
conclusions: "First, at least in arbitral practice, a lex mercatoria as something
akin to an independent legal order does exist, but plays a marginal role.
Secondly, most relevant national legal systems do not second-guess an
arbitrator's application of a non-national legal standard." 43 Along similar
lines, a second study of the legal culture of global business transactions has
concluded that the "lex mercatoria, at least at the present time, seems to have
far greater significance in the minds of legal scholars and sociologists of law
than it does for the merchants themselves." 44 Last but not least, the CENTRAL
study, which provides a broad set of statistically significant findings based on
evaluation of more than 700 usable survey instruments, reaches a similar
conclusion. 45
In the end, both of the foregoing sets of empirical "gap" findings appear
to deal with apples and oranges, but this appearance is deceptive. Taken
together, these findings raise important questions about the transnational legal
field. The existence of gaps as such is hardly news. Indeed, investigating the
causes and consequences of gaps between what law claims to be and how it
operates in practice is a staple in the socio-Iegal toolkit. Whether this research
approach is deployed to gain knowledge for its own sake, or in the service of
particular reform or policy goals, my basic point remains the same. Neither
basic knowledge can be gained, nor legal reform or other policy aims soundly
served, without understanding what is happening on the ground, and why.
The first set of conclusions about the ClSG pertain to the relative
ignorance that prevails in a particular country about binding provisions of law.

42 DASSER, supra note 11, at 196. He updated his original 1980s study and concludes that
what he discovered then still holds true. Ibid., at 198.

43 Ibid., at 198. In Dasser's view, "the lex mercatoria is a fascinating toy. However, for
businesspeople and their lawyers it is largely irrelevant, apart from the humble (but very
important) trade usages. But then, ... the latter are completely different and should be called by
their traditional name in order to avoid misunderstandings." Ibid., at 198-199. See also Felix
DASSER, U 'Lex Mercatoria', Werkzeug der Praktiker oder Spielzeug der Lehre?", 1 Schweizerische
Zeitschrift far intemationa/es und europaisches Recht (1991),299-323.
44

GESSNER I APPELBAUM I FELSTINER, supra note 17, at 18.

45 BERGER et a/., supra note 34 (noting the existence of a Usubstantial gap between the
assumptions of lawyers who discuss the theory of transnational commercial law and the
assumptions and viewpoints of internatioriallegal practice.'1.
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As such, these findings simultaneously explain 46 and raise questions about
how to close the sizeable gap in a given setting. They also raise questions
about the role of lawyers and judges in the transnational legal field. The
second set of conclusions, which pertain to the academic-practice gap and
raise further questions about the about the role of legal academics in the
transnational legal field, are more ambiguous in terms of their policy implications. Thus, all of the studies noted above, despite being fundamentally
different in their particulars, are linked via their broader implications, which
draw attention to particular knowledge deficiencies and to the central role of
legal actors in constructing the transnational legal field.
For those committed to closing the "ignorance" gap about the ClSG (or
other transnational norms), the most obvious solution is to spread the word .
. Information has become readily available through the World Wide Web, but
even assuming ready access - which cannot safely be assumed in all countries
where the CISG has been adopted - lawyers and dispute resolvers must first
conceive of the idea of searching for norms originating outside their domestic
legal order, if they are ever to find the extensive resources now available online. 47 In fact, the perceived need to disseminate information about international uniform law has been on the agenda of international organizations,
such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) that produced the CISG, as well as of professional organizations
concerned with matters of public and private international law,48 since long
46 Widespread ignorance regarding the existence of the CISG offers at best a partial
explanation for the relative paucity of published U.S. judicial or arbitral decisions applying its
provisions. Numerous alternative explanations can be imagined, such as the widespread
"common wisdoms" that many, if not most American lawyers advise their clients to opt out of the
ClSG, or that merchants simply prefer arbitration. Other conceivable explanations might draw on
the host of factors that are relevant to a decision whether or not to pursue a wrong by means of
legal process. With regard to the latter point, albeit in a domestic rather than a transnational
context, see William FELSTINER I Richard L. ABEl I Austin SARAT, "The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... ", 15 Law & Society Review (1980),
631; Stewart MACAULAY, "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study", 28
American Sociological Review (1963), 55.
47 See, e.g., CENTRAL Database, available at < http:www.tldb.de>; ClSG Database, Pace
Institute· for International Commercial law, available at < http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu> (including a link to the "Autonomous Network of ClSG Websites"); International Trade law
Monitor, available at <http://www.jus.uio.no/lm> (public-private project of Norwegian
universities
and
Cameron
May
ltd.);
UNCITRAl
Website,
available
at
<http://www.uncitral.org>; UNIDROIT Website, available at <http://www.unidroit.org>; Unilex
Website, available at <http://www.unilex.org> (CiSG & UNIDROIT Principles).
48 For example, the goal of informing practicing laWyers and judges about the ClSG and
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before the advent of the Internet. To take one fateful example, this topic was
on the agenda at the 1992 UNCITRAl Colloquium on Uniform Commercial
law in the Twenty-First Century, where New York attorney, Michael Sher,
suggested organizing a moot competition, in which students would work on a
case that was governed by the ClSG and presented in an arbitral forum. 49 This
proposal led quickly to the creation of the Willem C. Vis International
Commercial Arbitration Moot, which is discussed in Part III below.
As for the academic-practice knowledge gap, different conclusions may
be drawn. The first is that more and better empirical studies are desirable to
bring theory into line with actual conditions. However, this is true only insofar
as scholars are motivated by a scientific, inquiring spirit, rather than by
normative considerations or other interests. Mention has already been made
of the fact that debates over lex mercatoria have "religious" overtones, which
implies that they are, at least in some cases, rooted in belief or ideology, and
thus tantamount to tenets of faith.50 Such strong commitments seem to be the
exception rather than the rule, and are commonly tempered by healthy doses
of pragmatism,51 as well as by increasing acceptance among traditional legal
other uniform law, as well as other private international law issues, has been a frequent topic of
discussion within the Private International Law Committee of the American Bar Association
Section of Intemationallaw, which I chaired from 1989-1992, as well as the Private International
Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law, which I chaired from 1999-2003.
49 Intervention of Michael J. SHER, Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-First Century:
Proceedings of the Congress of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, New
York, 18-22 May 1992, UN Sales No. E.94.V.14, (1995), 94-103 (101).
50 One commentator, for example, has characterized Berger's work as embodying a
"concrete ideological commitment." HATZlMIHAIL, supra note 21. For his part, Goldman - the
modern progenitor of the view of lex mercatoria as an autonomous legal system - held the view
that lex mercatoria was based on natural law. Berthold GOLDMAN, "Arbitrage international et droit
commun des nations", Revue de ['arbitrage (1956), 115-116. For an extreme example, see Harold
J. BERMAN, "World Law: An Ecumenical Jurisprudence of the Holy Spirit", Emory Public Law
Research Paper, No. 05-4 (February 2005) (proposing a jurisprudence of the emerging "world law"
- which the author defines to include N many aspects· of world economic law" - that would
"reflect the image of the tri-une God" and re-integrate the Htraditional schools of positivism,
stressing will (the policies of the lawmaker), natural law stressing reason (moral values inherent in
human nature), and the historical school stressing group memory (community traditions)"). For a
more skeptical view, see DE lv, supra note 3, at 167 (expressing doubts about universalistic
notions predicated on "rationalism as a unifying factor" and describing this "conception [as] overly
ambitious, irrealistic and naive"), and at 168 (noting that this approach "hides value judgement
about what is desirable in international trade where different cultures may provide different
answers").
51 According to DE Lv, supra note 3, at 166, the "most important development in the
1990s is that the debate is to a certain extent not reduced to religion with believers and non-
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scholars and practitioners of the need for empirical studies. Yet the "let's get
on with it" orientation that has taken hold among some contemporary scholars
should not detract from the bottom line, which is that the professional
interests of legal actors have played a key role in the emergence of and
(relative) autonomy achieved within the transnational legal field. Indeed,
historical 52 and sOciological 53 studies demonstrate that legal professionals
occasionally mobilize doctrinal arguments in a rhetorical way, in order to
achieve ends that are beneficial to themselves. Thus, the second gap identified
above also suggests a second possible conclusion, namely that the lex
mercatoria is a professional project - a constructed legal field in which
developments emerge "as a product of competition and conflict" 54 - and not
just an automatic process driven by the inevitabilities of the market or the
needs of commerce.

By drawing attention to the agency of legal actors in this transnational
field, I do not wish to denigrate their painstaking efforts or heroic quest to
develop the lex mercatoria. Rather, my aim is to suggest that their agency
raises questions that are crucial to the continuing debate over the autonomous
character of the lex mercatoria, as well as to a broader understanding of the
role of legal actors in transnational governance, and thus deserving of further
believers but acknowledges somewhat more that the lex mercatoria - as conceived by Goldman
as an autonomous legal system - is here to stay as a fact of life and that the question is more about
the conditions and circumstances under which it should be applied." See also BERGER, Creeping
Codification, supra note 10, at 32-33 (bemoaning the fact that the "antimony of viewpoints" over
the lex mercatoria has brought the "discussion on a progressive evolution of transnational
commercial law .. , to a halt.").
52 See, e.g., Stephen E. SACHS, "From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of
the Medieval 'Law Merchant' ", 21 (5) American University International Law Review (2006), 685.
Sachs argues that the universalization of the law merchant in England in the seventeenth century
was a rhetorical tool deployed in the battle between civilians and common lawyers over
jurisdiction in commercial cases, in which the Common Law courts ultimately prevailed over
Chancery. In that context, the civilians argued that mercantile law was separate from the law of
the land, because it was part of a transnational tradition, and thus should be retained in separate
courts staffed by the civilian lawyers. Ibid., at 795-801. Sachs' account challenges the received
" 'Romantic' vision of a universal law merchant - produced, interpreted, and enforced by a
legally autonomous merchant class .... ." Ibid., at 688. Rather, he argues, the "Romantic
interpretation is deeply inaccurate, at leastas applied to the experience of medieval England, and
provides a prime example of the misuse of historical evidence in support of political ends." Ibid.,
at 690.
53 See, e.g., DEZALAY I GARTH, supra note 38 (arguing that the lex mercatoria was created
by an intellectual elite as a means of carving out a market niche for arbitration services and
reducing competition from members of the local bar).
54 Pierre BORDIEU, "Foreword", in DEZALAY I GARTH,supra note 38, at vii-x (vii).
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study. Of course, these are not the only questions that merit sustained
attention.
The extant body of empirical work, which has only been touched upon
above, is beset with methodological weaknesses 55 and full of holes. 56 Some
results are unclear or contradictory, while others suffer from insufficient
attention to research design (e.g., unfocused research questions; mismatch
between theory and method) or inadequate presentation of results. Moreover,
given the diverse theoretical approaches and the heterogeneous scopes of the
respective studies themselves, it is difficult (if not impossible) at this stage to
cumulate results, though some patterns (such as the modest ones identified
above) are visible. To some degree, these problems are endemic in a young
field of empirical inquiry. However, greater attention to such matters could
bring substantial rewards. There is, in addition, a gulf between studies that
look at business practices and those that look at legal practices. This gulf
could be bridged by collaborative work aimed at integrating these
perspectives. Indeed, such work is necessary to adjudicate theoretical claims
over the autonomy of the lex mercatoria. Another problem is that only a few
cultures and branches of trade have been studied thus far. This is a glaring
weakness in a transnational field, where a healthy skepticism towards
universalist 57 claims demands the broadest possible approach to the topic of
the role of law in transnational commercial life. 58 Finally, while the pragmatic
turn noted above may signal that the "religious wars" over lex mercatoria are
over for now, its future remains nonetheless an open book. And this book is
being written to a significant degree in Vienna, as explained in the next Part of
this essay.

55 While a detailed analysis of methodological problems is beyond the scope of this
essay, two key problems warrant mention: first, insufficient sample size, and second, sample bias
(or lack of representativeness, such as in geographical terms or in terms of the types of legal and
other actors surveyed).
56 For a broad assessment of the weaknesses of existing empirical research on lex
mercatoria, see Wioletta KONRADI / Hector FIX-FIERRO, HLex mercatoria in the mirror of empirical
research", 2-3 Socio/ogia del Diritto (2005),23.

57 DE Lv, supra note 3, at 167; see also N. JIN, liThe Status of Lex Mercatoria in
International Commercial Arbitration", 7 American Review of International Arbitration (1996),181
(attacking the universalist aspirations of the lex mercatoria from a developing country perspective,
on the basis that these countries have not agreed to the rules and were not involved in their
formation).

58 See, e.g., the studies of Guanxi in Felstiner / Gessner, Rules and Networks, supra note
3, at 325-420.
-------------~-----------.----------
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III. -THE WILLEM C. VIS INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION MOOT (VIS MOOT)

Since its conception in 1992, the Vis Moot has rapidly become a central event
in fa vida lex mercatoria. During my Cologne years, I had the good fortune to
collaborate with numerous colleagues and students at the Rechtszentrum fur
europfiische und internationa!e Zusammenarbeit (R.l.l.), which inter alia
provided high-quality international training for students, particularly via its
support for University of Cologne student participation in the Vis Moot since
1995. The R.l.l.'s far-reaching commitment to skills-oriented legal training put
it at the leading edge of a revolution in German legal education that appears
still to be in its infancy.59 But the Vis Moot, which began as a method for
teaching the next generation of lawyers about the CISG and international
commercial arbitration, has become much more. While still first and foremost
an event organized for the students who take part in the competition, the
Moot has also become a social practice that contributes to the development of
lex mercatoria (broadly defined). As such, the Vis Moot - now in its fifteenth
season - is a phenomenon worth taking seriously in socio-Iegal terms, not just
because of its sheer magnitude, but also because of its role in reproducing the
transnational legal field.
Compared to the lex mercatoria, the Vis Moot is neither controversial nor
shrouded in medieval or early modern history. Indeed, the Moot has barely
been noticed 60 in the voluminous academic literature about transnational
law, presumably owing to the dubious assumption that nothing important
could happen ata student competition. I hope here to take a first step towards
correcting this misconception.
The sheer number of participants in the Vis Moot is daunting for the
Vienna-based organizers. From the intimate group of 11 teams that competed
in the first Moot in 1993-1994,61 the roster has risen steadily to 178 teams
participating at the fourteenth Moot in 2006-2007. All together, more than
1270 teams drawn from 281 universities in 61 countries (counting Kosovo,
59 For an overview of recent changes in German legal education, see Laurel 5. TERRY,
"Living with the Bologna Process: Recommendations to the German Legal Education Community
from a u.s. PerSpective", 7 German Law Journal No. 11 (1 November 2006).
60 Bergsten has provided an authoritative overview of the first ten years' experience of the
Vis Moot. 5eeEric E. BERGSTEN, "Ten Years of th~ Willem C. Vis Intemational Commercial
Arbitration Moot", [2003] International Arbitration Law Review, 37-42. My modest additions to the
foundation Bergsten already laid are based on data that he kindly provided, which I gratefully
acknowledge.
61 I had the privilege of coaching the team from Eotvos Lorand Tudomanyegytem (ELTE
University) in Budapest (Hungary) at the first Vis Moot.
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Montenegro and Taiwan) had participated in the Vienna-based Moot by
2007. 62 Many institutions have sent teams to Vienna from some countries e;g., from Australia (13), Canada (9), P.R. China: (9), France (10), Germany (25),
India (19), Mexico (8), Switzerland (7), Turkey (7), the United Kingdom (16),
and the United States (60) - whereas Virtually aI/law schools from some other
countries have been represented at the Moot. The rate of participation among
the 281 participating institutions varies. Very few of them have participated in
all 14 Moots. Indeed, as of 2007,41 % of the schools had only attended once
(27%) or twice (14%), and the vast majority (74%) had attended fewer than
half of the Moots. Of the remaining 26% that have participated in at least half
(i.e., seven or more) of the Vienna-based Moots, roughly half of those
institutions are located in Europe, and the other half are located elsewhere. 63
Expense is surely a significant factor in each institution's decision whether
to participate in the Moot, and how often. Still, slightly more than half of the
over 1270 teams that participated in the Moot during its first fourteen years
travelled to Vienna from outside Europe. All together, approximately 5.3 % of
the teams participating in the first 14 Vienna-based Moots came from India,
5.4% from Central and Latin America (including Mexico), 5.7% from Asia, 7%
from Australia and New Zealand, and 28% from Canada and the
Not

u.s.

62 The thirteenth (2005-2006) and fourteenth (2006-2007) Vis Moots saw a dramatic
increase in the number of participating countries (from 51 in 2005 to an overall total of 61 in 2007,
or a 16% jump), as well as in new universities participating (from 229 in 2005 to 281 by 2007, or
an 18% jump). The new countries joining the Moot since 2005 are: Azerbaijan, EI Salvador,
Estonia, Georgia, Iceland, Malaysia, Montenegro, Portugal, Sri Lanka and Venezuela. Among the
52 new participating universities since 2005 are a few surprises, among them Sciences Po (France),
the "social sciences university in the heart of Paris."
63 In recent years, a "sister" competition - the HVis (East) Moot" - has sprung up in Hong
Kong, in part to-facilitate participation by a broader range of teams. Since 2003-2004, the Vis (East)
Moot has been conducted parallel to each year's main Vis Moot in Vienna. The problem and rules
used in Hong Kong are virtually identical to those used in Vienna, although the schedule is slightly
different, in part to accommodate those who wish to participate in both Moots. The Vis (East)
Moot, like the original Vienna-based Moot, has experienced rapid growth since its inception. The
first Vis (East) Moot (2003-2004) involved 14 teams from six different countries, and the fourth
(2006-2007) involved 46 teams from 14 different countries. As might be expected, the Vis (East)
Moot attracts a relatively high percentage of participation from Asian countries, ranging from 86%
in the first Vis (East) Moot (including Australia, or 71 % excluding Australia), to 54% in 2006-2007
(including Australia,or 41 % excluding Australia). The Vis (East) Moot has been regularly attended
by teams from China, India, Indonesia, Japan and Thailand, and in 2006-2007 was joined for the
first time by a team from South Korea. The declining percentage of Asian participation in the Vis
(East) Moot reflects growing participation in the Vis (East) Moot by teams from Europe and the
Western Hemisphere (Brazil, Canada and the U.S.). Further information about the Vis (East) Moot is
available at < http://www.cisgmootorg>.
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surprisingly, the bulk of the teams have come from Europe (48.5% including·
Turkey). A substantial number (11.6%) of all teams that participated in the
Moot by 2007 came from former East Bloc countries, and 14% of the teams
came from Germany alone.
Yet despite this remarkably broad distribution, participation in the Vis
Moot remains unrepresentative of the global community. Africa is sorely
underrepresented at the Vis Moot. In fourteen years, only one team has come
from Nigeria, and six from South Africa. Moreover, Arab countries and the
Middle East are virtually absent from this event, although predominantly
Muslim countries in other parts of the world - Azerbaijan, Indonesia, KOSOVOi
Malaysia, and Turkey - have been participating in the Vienna-based Moot in
small but growing numbers (all together 2.4 % of the total number of teams).

i,

All participating teams converge on Vienna each spring,64 in order to
present their claims (consisting of at least four arguments per team) before a
tribunal consisting of three arbitrators. While no aggregate numbers of student
participants are publicly available, most teams have at least two members, and
some teams consist of ten and more students, not to mention the (sometimes
numerous) coaches who accompany their teams to Vienna. Former team
members often become coaches in later years, and work either with or
without supervision by faculty members or more experienced lawyers. As of
the tenth Moot in 2002-2003, more than 3,600 students had participated in the
Vis Moot, of whom many have gone on to join the Moot Alumni Association
(MAA) that was founded by a group of student participants after the third Moot
in 1995-1996. The MAA, which began by organizing social events for student
participants during the week in Vienna, has added significant professional
activities to its remit, such as publishing a professional journal (Vindobona
Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration) and making use of
its U.N. Observer status to participate in meetings of UNCITRAL and its
working groups.
The Vis Moot also attracts significant professional resources. First,
hundreds of legal professionals devote their time and talent to the Moot,
whether as coaches, evaluators of the students' written submissions,
arbitrators judging the student's performance in the oral competition, or all of
64 In fact, for some teams, the pleading component of the Moot starts earlier, at
informally-arranged pre-Vienna practice rounds organized at various European (and possibly also
at non-European) law schools. These informal pre-Moot rounds are attended by Moot teams from
numerous European and non-European universities. In addition, many Moot teams have the
opportunity to practice their pleadings at law firms or in other professional settings before they
arrive in Vienna.
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the above. Approximately 300 persons served in one or the other evaluative
capacity (or both) at the twelfth Moot in 2004-2005. The fact that, for some
participants, the Moot is a tax-deductible - and possibly even an all-expensespaid - trip to Vienna during the opera season, is nowhere apparent in their
level of commitment and enthusiasm. Second, enormous financial resources
are poured into the event, whether through sponsorship by public and private
donors, donation of facilities (e.g., space at the University of Vienna and at
various local law firms) where the pleading rounds are held, or the costs
associated with each individual's presence in Vienna that week. Recent years
have seen an explosion in social events for the professionals in attendance,
mainly sponsored by Vienna law firms who invite virtually all (non-student)
participants to lavish receptions held every evening of the week but one. The
Vis Moot is a unique professional event, owing in large part to the multigenerational mix and the extraordinarily high level of enthusiasm and
collegial ity.
Taken as a whole, the Vis Moot has become one of the most important
annual gatherings of the lex mercatoria and international arbitration community. The atmosphere is remarkably informal, and students have many
opportunities to mix with the top lawyers, arbitrators, and professors in the
field. Professional conferences are often scheduled around the Moot, as are
optional special training programs for students. In some respects, the artifice
of the Moot shapes events in the commercial and legal world. Elite
practitioners and arbitrators schedule their own work around the Moot, and
scholars race to complete pertinent publications so that they can be publicized on the Moot Website (hosted by Pace University under the stewardship
of AI Kritzer), or at least distributed by hand among their colleagues in
Vienna. Moreover, by focusing on cutting-edge legal issues, the Moot not only
attracts scholarly debate, but can even push doctrinal change. 65
The Vis Moot has more than succeeded at what it was designed to
achieve. It has reached large numbers of budding and experienced legal
professionals from around the globe. Students not only learn about the eISG,
other hard and soft transnational legal norms, and international commercial
arbitration, but also catch the internationalist spirit and idealism about lex
mercatoria that permeate the event. Knowledge and experience, in this
context, combine to foster beli_ef and commitment, which in turn provide
fertile grounds for further development of the transnational legal field. The Vis

65 For example; one issue in the twelfth Moot problem focused on a "glitch" in the new
Swiss arbitration rules, which were quickly amended to resolve the problem.
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Moot is a breeder reactor, a "communicative event" in which the "selfreproducing, worldwide legal discourse" 66 about the lex mercatoria replicates at a geometric rate. It is not only "the place where the next arbitration
generation is being raised and moulded," but is also "a place where a true
transnational culture of arbitration is being developed." 67 It is, each spring,
the place to be, where old-timers and newcomers alike live la vida lex
mercatoria to the hilt.
IV. -MULTI-/INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY

Leaving aside the gradual acceptance among legal professionals that ever more
empirical studies of the lex mercatoria would be useful, there remain starkly
diverging views on the value of multi- or interdisciplinary approaches to legal
topics, particularly among different academic cultures. These differences were
brought home to me during conversations with colleagues in Germany, some of
whom urged me il') no uncertain terms to quit the socio-Iegal path. This advice,
coming in particular from R.I.Z. Director Norbert Horn, whose scholarship
spans the range from philosophical to practical and also includes a number of
disciplinary cross-border forays,68 surprised but also provoked me to seek to
understand the reasons behind such dire warnings.
My German colleagues advanced three major arguments against interdisciplinary work by legal scholars. The first is that considerations of laborefficiency (Arbeitsokonomie) preclude anything beyond minimal borrowing
across disciplinary .Iines. 69 Second, institutional concerns caution against such
66
67
68

;

."

TEUBNER, supra note 4, at 7-8.
Gabrielle KAUFMANN-KoHLER, NPresident's Message", 23(1) ASA Bulletin (2005), 1.

Hom's oeuvre includes some works that incorporate perspectives gleaned from other
disciplines. See, e.g.,. Norbert HORN, NPerson und Kontinuitat, Versprechen und Vertrauen: die
Perspektive des Zivilrechts", in Richard Schenk (Ed.), Kontinuitat der Person: Zum Versprechen
und Vertrauen (2001), 35-74 [hereinafter: HORN, Person und Kontinuitat] (anthropology); Norbert
HORN, "Bankwirtschaft und Bankrecht in interdisziplinarer Perspektive", in Detlef Bierbaum I
Klaus Feinen (Eds.), Bank- und Finanzwirtschaft: Strategien im Wandel (1997), 221-243
[hereinafter: HORN, Bankwirtschaft] (new economic institutionalism; economic analysis of law).
More generally, Professor Hom was a member of the Direktorium of the Zentrum' fur
interdiszipilinare Forschung at the University of Bielefeld from 1974-1981, and also served as
Managing Director of the Bank Law Division of the Institut fUr Bankwirtschaftrecht und Bankrecht
at the University of Cologne.

69 HORN, Bankwirtschaft, supra note 68, at 227 {liEs gibt gute Grunde fur diese fachliche
Trennung und Arbeitsteilung. Die Problemfulle auf iedem Arbeitsgebiet ist zu gross, als dass man
mehr als einen Seitenblick auf die Nachbardiszipfin werfen konnte, um sich dann wieder auf das
eigene Fach tu konzentrieren. '" Die interdisziplinare Orientierung durch Beschaffung
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endeavours. And third, some argue that the principal task of the legal
academic is to address normative questions, and in particular to stay "dose to
practice" and seek solutions to -real problems.70
As to the first concern, J believe that the drive towards efficiency must
yield, at least on occasion, to the yearning for deeper insight. Ohnesorge
rightly argues that "[a]lthough disciplines may share so little at the level of
theory that they seem to speak in different languages, when specific issues or
institutions are being studied, especially in a comparative context, the
contributions of views derived from radically different theoretical starting
points can be crucial to full understanding." 71 Moreover, some questions such as the autonomy of the lex mercatoria - cannot be resolved rhetorically
by the better argument, but only by evidence. Finally, in my own case, the
ability to "speak" in multiple disciplinary languages is as vital as being
bilingual in German and English.
As for institutional concerns, my colleagues' warnings about the dangers
of the socio-Iegal path are surely wise in the German academic context, where
there are few professional opportunities for interdisciplinary scholars,72

notwendiger Informationen des jeweils anderen Fachs erfolgt .. , moglichst arbeitsokonimisch, d.h.
seJektiv und restriktiv."j ("There are good reasons for the separation between disciplines and the

t

I
I

r

J

1
f,
~f

division of academic labor. The abundance of problems needing attention in each field is too large
to permit anything more than a sidelong glance at the other discipline, before returning to one's
own field. Interdisciplinary orientation via acquisition of necessary information about the other
discipline must be carried out in the most labor-efficient way possible, that is, selectively and
restrictively. U - translation by the author). Later in that same text, Horn warns that interdisciplinary
scholars run the danger of succumbing to uMethodensynkretismus oder ... der Uferlosigkeit des
Stoffes und der Betrachtungsweise"("methodological syncretism or the boundlessness of the
material and approaches" - translation by the author). Ibid., at 232.
'
70 This priority has led Horn to produce a large body of work that is extremely useful for
practicing lawyers as well as for advanced students.
71 John K.M. OHNESORGE, "Understanding Chinese Legal and Business Norms", in
Felstiner / Gessner, Rules and Networks, supra note 3, at 363-383 (364).
72 leading socio-Iegal scholars noted in 1998 that it was "mainly [the Volkswagenstiftung's] generous support of socio-Iegal research which keeps empirical studies in the field of
the sociology of law alive in an environment more conducive to doctrinal legal research in
Germany." GessnerI Budak, in Emerging Legal Certainty, supra note 8, at xv. Socio-Iegal studies
in Germany are often referred to as an Orchideenfach, that is,an "orchid subject" consisting of
rare and exotic species that can only thrive in an artificial hot-house atmosphere. This derogatory
label generally implies that the academic field in question is too specialized and "too academic"
or cut off from solving problems in the oreal world". I note in passing that this criticism is hardly
apt when it comes to empirical studies of law (including "law in action" studies), which often have
important policy implications.
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despite burgeoning interest in such research.?3 It is disappointing to see that
socio-Iegal studies, to which German-language scholars have made such
important theoretical contributions, have been so marginalized in Germany in
recent decades. By way of contrast, socia-legal studies have experienced
dramatic growth and achieved a high level of popularity during the same time
frame in the Common law 74 world. There was a trend toward social scientific studies of law in Germany in the 1970s,75 which was at least temporally
parallel, if not causally related to the take-off of this trend in the Common law
world at around the same time.76 I have no explanation at hand for the
developmental trajectory in Germany,77 but can offer some thoughts on
recent developments in the United States. 78
73 _ For example, the Zweite Nachwuchs Tagung des Berliner Arbeitskreises Rechtswirklichkeit (BAR), which was held in Halle in November 2005, was attended by some 120
persons, including a handful of the dedicated professors and Privatdozenten actively involved in
law as an interdisciplinary research topic. Moreover, the Berlin 2007 Joint Meeting of the Law and
Society Association and the Research Committee on Sociology of Law (International Sociological
ASsociation) drew nearly 2,500 active participants, albeit not all from Germany.
• 74 This discussion is based on my knowledge of legal academia in the United States, and
does not presume to apply equally to Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, where legal
education is quite different. It nonetheless bears mention that socia-legal studies are also strong in
those three countries, perhaps even stronger than in the u.s.
75 See U. ROHL, "1st die Rechtswissenschaft iiberhaupt eine Wissenschaft?" (Vortrag Bremen, 08.07.2005), at 10 (describing the failed attempt in the 1970s by German legal academics to
counter the attack on law's status as a "real science" by turning towards the social sciences). The
tension between doctrinal and empirical or social scientific approaches is pemaps most pronounced
in the field of constitutional or public law. Already in the 1970s, German legal scholars debated the
need for social scientific studies in the field of constitutionalism. -Powerful calls for multidisciplinary
approaches to the topic were countered by resistance from those who feared dilution of the legal
monopoly. For a contemporary study that confirms the relative lack, while Simultaneously
demonstrating the value of cross-disciplinary approaches to the question of constitutional
amendment, see Andreas BUSCH, "Das oft geanderte Grundgesetz", in Wolfgang Merkel I Andreas
Busch (Eds.), Demokratie in Ost und West Fur Klaus von Beyme (1999), 549--574.
76 See, generally, Bryant GARTH I Joyce STERLING, "From Legal Realism to Law and
Society: Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Activist State", 32 Law and Society Review
(1998),409; David TRUBEK, NBack to the Future: The Short and Happy Life of the Law and Society
Movement", 18(1) Florida State University Law Review (1990), 4-55.
77 For a recent and thorough analysis of the German developments, see Michael WRASI
"Rechtssoziologie und Law and Society - Die deutsche Rechtssoziologie zwischen Krise un
Neuaufbruch", 27 Zeitschrift fUr Rechtssozio/ogie (2006), 289--312. For a comparative perspectivi
see Kristoffel GRECHENIG I Martin GELTER, NThe Transatlantic Divergence in legal Thougr
American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism", University of Sl. Gallen Law ar
Economics Researc;;h Paper Series, Working Paper No. 25-2007.
78 For a critical view of these developments in the U.S., see Anthony D'AMATO, "Th
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One possible explanation for the growth of socia-legal studies in
Common Law settings, but not in Germany, relates to the status preferences of
legal academics. Compared to the lofty notion of legal science (Rechtswissenschaft) 79 that permeates the German academic enterprise, legal
training in the Common Law world is of humbler origin. 80 In the United
States, for example, legal education was initially in the hands of the legal
profession itself, and only gradually migrated over to the universities. "In 1800
apprenticeship was almost universal; today, school training is, practically
speaking, the only real path to the bar." 81 Notwithstanding the dominant role
of the universities, however, legal education in the United States is regulated
by the legal profession via the American Bar Association (ABA), which keeps
the law schools under tight rein through its power of accreditation.
Many contemporary American law professors, while not too proud to
accept substantially higher salaries than those paid to their colleagues in the
social sciences and humanities, would chafe at the suggestion that they toil in
a vocational field. The reluctance among many U.S. legal educators to think of
legal education as a "trade school" has been aggravated by increasing ABA
pressure to beef up the skills training component of legal education,82 as well
Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Education", Northwestern University School ofLaw Public Law and
Legal Theory Series, No. 06-32 (2006).
79 See, generally, ROHl, supra note 75, for a discussion of the perennial debates about
whether legal science (Rechtswissenschaft) is a 'true science'. According to Ruhl, ibid., at 12-14, law
is a 'cultural science' (Kulturwissenschaft) in the sense articulated by Rickert in 1898, and
characterized by interpretive methodology, in contrast to the explanatory methods employed in
connection with the study of natural phenomena (Naturwissenschaft). Rickert's dichotomy, however,
does not adequately account for the social sciences, which partake of both elements. Elsewhere, Ruhl
characterizes legal history, legal sociology and comparative law as desGriptive/explanatory "SeinsWissenschaften" - as mere auxiliary "Hilfswissenschaften" that support but are subordinate to the
"Solf-Wissenschaft" of legal dogmatics (Rechtsdogmatik)~ Ibid., at 10.
80 This is not to deny the fact that the Continental tradition of legal science was influential
in the U.S., particularly during the formative years of university-based legal education. See, e.g.,
laura I. ApPLEMAN, "The Rise of the Modern American Law School: How Professionalization,
German Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped Our System of legal Education", 39 New England
Law Review (2005), 251; Lawrence M. FRIEDMAN I Gunther TEUBNER, "legal Education and legal
Integration: European Hopes and American Experience", ;n M. Cappelletti I M. Seccombe / J.
Weiler (Eds.), Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience, Volume 1
(Methods, Tools and Institutions), Book 3 (Forces and Potential for a European Identity) (1986),
345-380 (355-356).
81

FRIEDMAN/TEUBNER, supra note 80, at 355.

82

AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,

Legal Education and Professional Development - An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (1992) (MacCrate Report).
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as to regularize the status of legal writing instructors and clinicians, who
historically had been treated as second-class members of the faculty and not
eligible for tenure. These (often hotly contested) changes in U.s. law faculties
have been accompanied by a temporally para"el change in the candidate
pool and in hiring preferences for tenure-track slots on u.s. law faculties. In a
nutshell, there has been a noticeable rise in the number of Ph.D.83 holders in
the law job applicant pool, along with a rising desire on the part of law
faculties to hire professors who are capable of multi- or interdisciplinary (and
particularly empirical) research.84
It is conceivable that these two trends 85 are not merely coincidental, but
also causally related. It may be, for example, that the U.S. legal academy is
striving towards the "scientific high ground" as a reaction or form of resistance
to the skills-oriented and democratizing pressures brought to bear by the ABA,
or that the trend is simply a way for the legal academy to enhance its
intellectual status by embracing the scientism that dominates U.S. social
sciences. Whether either of these explanations are (or could ever be proven)
correct, it is worth noting the paradox that legal education (or at least legal
scholarship) in the u.s. (and elsewhere in the Common Law world) is edging
towards a greater degree of "scientific" conceit, while German legal education
and scholarship are, at the same time, placing greater emphasis on skills
training.
An alternative explanation for the socio-Iegal trend in the United States
might simply be widespread consensus on the superiority of the approach.
The "sociological jurisprudence" and Legal Realist traditions of the early 20th
century have pre-disposed u.s. legal educators to be sceptical of purely
83 Since the Ph.D. degree in the U.S. is not available in the field of law, the growing
number of law professors with Ph.D. degrees points unambiguously towards a trend of hiring
faculty members who have multidisciplinary credentials (such as in anthropology, economics,
history, literature, philosophy, political science, or sociology), or who have been trained in special
interdisciplinary programs (s.uch as the University of California, Berkeley'S 30-year old program in
Jurisprudence and Social Policy). U.S. lawdoctorates are generally designated as S.J.D. or J.S.D.
degrees, and it is rare for U.S. lawyers or law professors to pursue this type of advanced degree.
For an historical perspective, see Gail J.. HUPPER, "The Rise of an Academic Doctorate in law:
Origins Through World War II", Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, No. 196 (2007).
84 The Law and Economics movement was the vanguard of this trend in law school
hiring, starting already in the 1980s. The trend towards socia-legal hiring and booming interest in
empirical studies is a more recent phenomenon.
85 I point to these trends wholly on the basis of personal experience as a faculty member
at various U.S. law schools since the late 1980s. I would be remiss if I did not call for empirical
research to substantiate my assertions and track these developments.
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doctrinal (i.e., dogmatische) approaches, even while most acknowledge that
their role includes preparing students to pass a state bar examination at the
end of their studies. 86 From this perspective, legal doctrine divorced from
consideration of causes and consequences is simply incomplete, in both the
scientific (scholarly) and the pedagogic contexts of law as an academic
discipline. Such a pedagogic approach would ill-prepare students for a life in
the law, where "good legal strategies are a function of social and cultural
dynamics that owe little indeed to the force of legal logic. [Rather,] the
cultural, the social, and the political create possibilities for reform through
litigation quite beyond those sanctioned or even hinted at by the governing
legal standards." 87
Taken together, the affinity of the u.s, legal system for "outside"
perspectives on law provides at best a partial explanation for the currerit
popularity of socio-Iegal and empirical approaches to law, and must be
combined with institutional factors, such as those noted earlier, in order to
explain the trend. Yet the fact that socio-Iegal studies are also trendy in other
Common Law countries suggests that additional factors, including legal
culture, might well bear on a fuller answer to this question.
Returning once more to my German colleagues' arguments for quitting
the socio-Iegal path, it remains to discuss the third reason, which is rooted in
the notion that such work is a detour from the fundamentally normative nature
of the legal academic enterprise. 88 Yet the ability to answer questions about
"how law should be" must, in my view, rest on solid knowledge about actual
conditions of law and society, including (but not limited to) knowledge of
how the economic world works. This reservation aside, I take the point that
we cannot excise our own views and values from our scholarly and pedagogic
86

In contrast to Germany, where many if not most students spend substantial time at the

Repetitor prior to sitting for their First State Examination, American "bar review" courses tend to

be quite short.
87 Steven l. WINTER, A Clearing in the Forest Law, Life, and Mind (2001), xiii. "What
legal actors need ... is something like a cognitive map of the cultural models and other social
constructs that animate. thinking and decisionmaking among lawyers, judges, and laypersons
alike." Ibid.
88 See, e.g., Norbert HORN, Einfiihrung in die Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie
(3. Auflage, 2004); HORN, Person und Kontinuitat, supra note 68. See also Norbert HORN, "Codes
of Conduct for MNEs and Transnational Lex Mercatoria: An International Process of Learning and
Law Making", in Norbert Horn (Ed.), Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Enterprises (1980), 45 (61) (noting as a weakness of transnational commercial law that it is
developed by intemational commercial practice even though this practice does not necessarily
meet the ethical and socio-economic standards of modern society).
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activities. 89 Indeed, much of my _academic interest in legal professionals is
animated by curiosity about how our personal commitments, whatever their
source, affect the course of the law, and by the question «cui bono?" 90
V.- CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, I believe that much legal scholarship, including that devoted to lex
mercatoria as well as to broader issues surrounding uniform law, results from
the various commitments of past, current, and future generations of lawyers
and legal academics. Professional curiosity, like so many other personal
attributes, is rooted in our values and interests, however dimly we may
perceive or acknowledge them. From my American (and deeply Legal Realist)
perspective, the reflected vida lex mercatoria is - with apologies to Socrates decidedly worth living, especially when combined with a skeptical empirical
approach towards received wisdom.

89 See Richard CRASWELL, liDo Trade Customs Exist", in j.5. Kraus / S.D. Walt (Eds.), The
Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law (2000), 118-148 (118-119) (arguing
that the "goals, beliefs and other normative premises" of persons undertaking to identify the
existence of trade customs lIinevitably" playa role in this process).
90 In this regard, it strikes me as odd that some proponents of lex mercatoria identify
themselves as IIprogressives" and label me ·conservative" because I have on occasion called for
the observance of some limits on party autonomy. See, e.g., Helen E. HARTNELL, "Rousing the
Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods", 18 Yale Journal of International Law (1993),1-93. This inversion of the ordinary meaning
of these terms reflects the presumption of radical party autonomy that is-prevalent among those
committed to the transnational legal order, according to which State-imposed constraints are
anathema. The tenn Uprogressive", in their usage, takes ona neoliberal glare, while ·conservative"
implies an anachronistic belief in regulation by the State.

Unit. L Rev. 2007

----~--.~-----

